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ABSTRACT
I analyze the effects of a program that pays both 11th and 12th grade students and teachers for passing
scores on Advanced Placement exams on college outcomes. Using a difference-in-differences strategy,
I find that affected students of all ethnicities attend college in greater numbers, have improved college
GPAs, and are more likely to remain in college beyond their freshman year. Moreover, the program
improves college outcomes even for those students who would have enrolled in college without the
program. I also find evidence of increased college graduation for black and Hispanic students ￿ suggesting
that late high-school interventions may confer lasting positive effects on students, and may be effective
at improving the educational outcomes of minority students. The finding of enduring benefits when
extrinsic motivators are no longer provided is important in light of concerns that incentive-based-interventions
may lead to undesirable practices such as “teaching-to-the-test” and cheating.
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  College matriculation and completion rates for low-income and ethnic-minority students 
in the United States are much lower than those for affluent whites.
1 These disparities are 
sobering because much of the differences in wages between whites and minorities can be 
attributed to differences in skills prior to labor market entry (Neal and Johnson 1996).
2 While 
there are differences in college going across groups, much of the gaps in educational attainment 
across sociodemographic groups occur among those who enter college but do not persist 
(Adelman 1999, Bowen and Bok 1998, Jencks and Phillips 1998).
3 Because academic 
preparedness is key to college success (Tinto 1993, Kalsner 1991) policies that improve 
scholastic ability of low-income and ethnic-minority students before college entry may reduce 
these differences in college enrollment and college persistence across groups.  
  Early educational interventions have been found to have large effects on adult outcomes 
(Currie 2001, Deming 2009) and some argue that that remediation of inadequate early 
investments is difficult and costly (Cunha and Heckman 2007, Cunha, Heckman and Lochner 
2006). However, if academic underperformance is a result of some economic inefficiency (such 
as imperfect information, student myopia, suboptimal teacher or student effort), late 
interventions that alleviate such inefficiency could be very cost effective. While there are 
numerous programs aimed at high school students with the aim of increasing college-going and 
readiness, rigorous evaluations of these interventions on college outcomes are lacking.
4 Because 
students often self-select into college preparation programs, most studies on the efficacy of pre-
college interventions on college success are largely descriptive.
5  
  In this paper I analyze the effects of a high-school intervention that includes cash 
incentives for both teachers and students for each passing score earned on an AP exam, teacher 
training, curricular oversight, and test-prep sessions on students college outcomes. The 
                                                 
1 Using the August 2006 Current Population Survey, I find that 71 percent of white high-school graduates or GED 
holders between the ages of 25 and 29 ever enrolled in some college program. The corresponding figures are 60 and 
52 percent for blacks and Hispanics respectively. The share of entrants who have earned an AA or BA degree for 
these same groups are 68% for whites, 51% for blacks and 53% for Hispanics.  
2 Cameron and Heckman (2001) and Belley and Lochner (2007) find that long-run factors associated with family 
environment such as parental education account for most of the differences in college-going across ethnic groups. 
3It is well documented that the majority of college attrition occurs in the first year - so that persistence through the 
first year is a key predictor of subsequent college success (Brawer 1996, Horn 1998, Bradburn 2002).  
4 For example, evaluations of the GEAR UP program have looked at the effect on college aspiration, but not on 
actual college outcomes. Source: http://www.gearupdata.org/GearUpEvaluation.cfm. 
5 There are two notable exceptions. Using random assignment, Seftor, Mamun and Schirm (2009) find no effect of 
Upward Bound overall, but provide some evidence of increased postsecondary enrollment and completion for 
students with low educational expectations. Also using a randomized design Kemple and Willner (2008) find that 
career academics improved the labor market outcomes of young men. 3 
 
Advanced Placement Incentive Program (APIP) is targeted primarily to low-income, minority-
majority school districts with a view towards improving college-readiness. 
New   M exico  and 
New   York  City  have  adopted  si m ilar  programs,  while  schools  in  Arkansas,  A labama, 
Connecticut,  Kentucky,  M assachusetts,  and  V irginia  have replicated the  APIP.
6 Using school-
level data, Jackson (2010) finds that the APIP increases AP participation, improves SAT and 
ACT performance and may increase college enrollment. The rich student-level data employed in 
this study allow me to account for student selection, and tests for the underlying mechanisms ─ 
providing a more conclusive analysis. Moreover, this study builds on Jackson (2010) by 
analyzing the effect of the APIP on important longer-run college outcomes.    
I investigate how the APIP, which affected 11
th and 12 grade students, affected (1) their 
college attendance (2) sophomore year college persistence (3) college GPA and (4) college 
completion. I link Texas high-school data to administrative Texas college records ─ allowing me 
to compare the college outcomes of students exposed to the APIP to those of students not 
exposed to the APIP, if they attended college in Texas.
7 Because the administrators of the APIP 
did not roll out the program to all interested high-schools at once, there is variation in the timing 
of APIP adoption within the sample of interested schools. This allows for a difference-in-
difference strategy ─ comparing the change in outcomes between observationally similar 
students from the same high-school before and after APIP adoption  to the change in outcomes 
across cohorts from other high-schools that did not adopt the APIP over the same time period. 
Comparing cohorts from the same high-school removes (1) the differences in unobserved 
attributes that make one student take AP courses while another does not and (2) the differences 
in unobserved attributes that make students from certain schools more likely to excel at college 
than others. Using changes at similar schools over the same time period as a comparison removes 
the effects of state policies and influences that may coincide with adoption at some schools.  
While the identification strategy removes several sources of bias, there are three 
remaining endogeneity concerns. The first is that APIP adoption may be endogenous. To address 
this, I limit the sample to schools that ever adopt the APIP, with similar levels of motivation. The 
timing of adoption within this sub-sample is determined by the idiosyncratic preferences and 
                                                 
6 Lyon (2007),  M edina (2007), and  M athews (2004), http:// www .national mathandscience.org
 
7 These data also allow me to account for selection to college, a source of bias in many studies on the pre-college 
determinants of college success (Breland 1979, Camara and Echternacht 2001). 4 
 
availability of private donors. Supporting this assertion, I show that outcomes change after 
adoption, conduct falsification tests on other school and principal inputs, and show that the 
results are robust to including school-specific trends. The second concern is that students may 
select to schools. I address this in three ways. First, I define “intention to treat” based on 
enrollment in 10
th grade rather than actual enrollment in 11
th and 12
th grade. Second, I show that 
the results are robust to eliminating students from non-feeder middle-schools, and making 
inferences within students who attended both the same middle- and high school. Lastly, I show 
that there is little empirical evidence of selective migration. The last concern is that with Texas 
college data only, shifting from out-of-state to in-state colleges as a result of the APIP would 
look like improved outcomes. To address this concern, using National Student Clearinghouse 
data I show that APIP adoption increases in-state, but not out-of-state, college going. In sum, I 
am reasonably confident that the estimates presented reflect a real causal effect.  
While secondary school interventions may improve contemporaneous student outcomes 
and increase college-going
8, there are a variety of reasons why such schemes may not improve 
outcomes after students enroll in college. First, improvements in outcomes may reflect test-
taking effort so that the contemporaneous gains in test scores may not persist.
9 Second, marginal 
college enrollees may subsequently fail or drop-out if they are not sufficiently college ready. 
Third, improved AP performance could come at the expense of other important unrewarded 
skills. For incentive-based interventions, such as the APIP, some psychologists argue that 
external rewards can supplant intrinsic motivation, such that performance may be worse after 
incentives are removed than if they had never been introduced.
10As such, it is important to study 
the longer-term effects of high-school interventions such as the APIP.  
                                                 
8Angrist and Lavy (2010) find that student incentives improve outcomes for girls, and Lavy (2009) and  Figlio and 
Kenny (2007) find that teacher incentives are associated with contemporaneous improvements in achievement for all 
students. Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos (2009) find that cash rewards for academic achievement lead to higher 
GPAs for females. Berry (2009) finds that performance incentives given to children improve educational outcomes 
when children have low initial test scores. Also, Dynarski (2008) and Scott-Clayton (2008) study the incentive 
effects of grade-contingent scholarships among college students.  
9 There is evidence that test scores can be boosted “artificially” by providing performance incentives on the day of 
the exam  (Braun and Kirsch 2008) or giving students calorie rich meals before an exam (Figlio and Winicki 2005). 
Also, Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) find that students did not retain the test score gains associated with teacher 
cash incentives, while Bettinger (2009) finds a similar lack of persistence over time for student cash rewards. 
However, Kremer, et al. (2004) find that gains associated with a merit scholarship program for girls in Kenya 
persisted, and Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos (2009) find that females offered cash rewards for academic 
achievement had higher GPAs that persisted after the rewards were provided. 
10 This notion is discussed in Deci and Ryan (1985) and has been popularized in Kohn (1999). For a balanced meta-
analysis of this literature see Cameron and Pierce (1994). 5 
 
I find that affected students took and passed more AP exams, and enrolled in college in 
greater numbers─ consistent with Jackson (2010). Moreover, conditional on college enrollment, 
affected students had higher grades and increased persistence. Improvements were relatively 
larger for black and Hispanic students and I find suggestive evidence that affected black and 
Hispanic students were more likely to graduate with a four-year degree. I show that these 
graduation results are unlikely to reflect faster time to degree. While the short-run outcomes 
were similar across schools (as in Jackson 2010), the long-run college effects were largest in 
schools with established AP programs before APIP adoption (and had little AP course 
expansion) and schools with high-powered incentives ─ suggesting that increased supply of AP 
courses was not the driving mechanism, and that increased teacher and student effort are 
important aspects of the program's success. Also, the program effects grow over time, indicating 
that the non-incentive aspects of the APIP are important. Guidance counselors credit increased 
AP participation to increased encouragement from teachers, better student information, and 
changes in teacher and peer norms ─ consistent with the APIP reducing suboptimal decisions.  
These findings indicate that both maintaining high standards, and increasing participation 
in rigorous high-school programs can improve college readiness. The results suggest that 
incentive programs that include resources to turn increased effort into achievement may have 
lasting positive effects even after rewards are no longer provided. These findings also contribute 
to the debate on early versus late interventions as they show that an inexpensive program 
targeted to high-school students is effective at increasing educational attainment.  
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the APIP 
program. Section III presents the theoretical framework. Section IV presents the data. Section V 
discusses the empirical strategy. Section VI presents the results, specification and robustness 
tests, shows that the results cannot be driven by changes in out-of-state college going, and 
presents evidence on mechanisms. Section VII concludes.  
 
II.    Description of the AP incentive program 
AP courses are common in US high schools and are typically taken by students in 11
th 
and 12
th grade. The courses are intended to be “college level” and most colleges allow successful 
AP exam takers to use them to offset degree requirements.
11 The fact that selective colleges pay 
                                                 
11 While this is true in general, some highly selective colleges only allow students to use AP credits to pass out of 6 
 
attention to a student’s AP scores in the admissions process demonstrates that the exams are 
considered to be revealing about a student’s likely preparation for and achievement in college. 
The AP program has 35 courses and examinations across 20 subject areas. The length of a course 
varies from one to two semesters.  The cost per examination is $82 and a fee reduction of $22 is 
granted to those students with demonstrated financial need. AP exams are administered by the 
College Board, making teacher cheating unlikely. Exams are graded from 1 through 5, where 3 
and higher are regarded as a passing grades. AP courses are taught during regular class time and 
generally substitute for another course in the same subject (AP Chemistry instead of 11
th grade 
science for example), for another elective course, or a free period. While AP courses count 
towards a student’s high school GPA, they are above and beyond what is required for high 
school graduation. As a rule, AP courses substitute for less demanding activities.
12 
The APIP is run by AP Strategies, a non-profit organization based in Dallas, and is 
entirely voluntary for schools, teachers, and students. The heart of the program is a set of 
financial incentives for teachers and students based on AP examination performance. It also 
includes teacher training conducted by the College Board and a curriculum that prepares students 
for AP courses in earlier grades. The APIP uses “vertical teams” of teachers. At the top of a 
vertical team is a lead teacher who teaches students and trains other AP teachers.
13 Vertical 
teams also include teachers whose grade precedes those in which AP courses are offered. For 
example, a vertical team might create a math curriculum starting in 7
th grade designed to prepare 
students for AP calculus in 12
th grade. In addition to the AP courses taught at school, there may 
be extra time dedicated to AP training. For example, the APIP in Dallas includes special “prep 
sessions” for students once or twice a year, where up to 800 students gather at a single high 
school to take seminars from AP teachers as they prepare for their AP exams (Hudgins 2003). 
The APIP’s monetary incentives are intended to encourage participation and induce effort 
in AP courses. AP teachers receive between $100 and $500 for each AP score of 3 or over 
earned by an 11
th or 12
th grader enrolled in their course and can receive discretionary bonuses of 
up to $1,000 based on results. In addition, lead teachers receive between $3,000 and $10,000 
annual salary bonus, and a further $2,000 to $5,000 bonus opportunity based on results. While 
the amount paid per passing AP score and the salary supplements are well defined in each 
                                                                                                                                                             
prerequisites, but not towards regular graduation credit.  
12Source: Executive Vice President AP Strategies and counselors at several Dallas high-schools.  
13 Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) find that teachers learn from their peers so that vertical teams may be effective. 7 
 
school, there is variation across schools in the amounts paid. Overall, the APIP can deliver a 




th grade also receive monetary incentives for performance. The 
program pays half of each student’s examination fees so that students on free or reduced lunch 
would pay $15 (instead of $30) while those who are not would pay $30 (instead of $60) per 
exam. Students receive between $100 and $500 for each score of 3 or above in an eligible subject 
for which they took the course. The amount paid per exam is well defined in each school, but 
there is variation across schools in the amount paid per passing AP exam. A student who passes 
several AP examinations during their 11
th and 12
th grades can earn several hundred dollars. For 
example, one student earned $700 in his junior and senior years for passing scores in AP 
examinations (Mathews 2004). Since students must attend the AP courses and pass the AP 
exams to receive the rewards, students who did not take the AP courses would not take the 
exams in an attempt to earn the cash rewards. This aspect of the incentives makes them relatively 
difficult to game and likely to increase overall student learning.  
The total cost of the program ranges from $100,000 to $200,000 per school per year, 
depending on the size of the school and its students’ propensity to take AP courses. The average 
cost per student in an AP class ranges from $100 to $300. Private donors pay for between 60 and 
75 percent of the total costs, and the district covers the remainder. Districts pay for teacher 
training and corresponding travel, release time and some of the supplies and equipment costs. 
Donors fund the cash rewards to students and teachers, stipends to teachers for attending team 
meetings, bonuses to teachers and administrators for AP performance, and some of the supplies 
and equipment costs. Today, districts can fund their contribution to the APIP using earmarked 
funds from the statewide AP incentive program and No Child Left Behind.
 However, in the first 
few years of the program such funds were not available.  
As a rule, adoption of the APIP works as follows. First, interested schools approach AP 
Strategies and are put on a list.
15 AP Strategies then tries to match interested schools to a donor. 
When a private donor approaches AP Strategies, he or she selects which schools to fund from 
                                                 
14 One AP English teacher in Dallas had 6 students out of 11 score a 3 or higher on the AP examination in 1995, the 
year before the APIP was adopted. In 2003, when 49 of her 110 students received a 3 or higher, she earned $11,550 
for participating in the program; this was a substantial increase in annual earnings (Mathews 2004). 
15 There are a few exceptions. Schools in Austin were approached by the donor to adopt the APIP in 2007. Also, five 
schools in Dallas secured a donor before approaching AP strategies. 8 
 
within the group of willing schools. In most cases the donor wants a specific district.
16 Once a 
willing group of schools has been accepted by the donor preparations are made (such as training 
and creation of curricula) and the program is implemented the following calendar year.
17 It takes 
about two years to fully implement the APIP after a school expresses interest. Donors choose the 
subjects that are rewarded and ultimately determine the size of the financial rewards. While there 
are differences across schools, most schools reward English, mathematics and sciences. 
There is variation in the timing of the introduction of the program across schools that I 
exploit to identify the effect of the program. As illustrated in Figure 1, there are 58 schools that  
adopted the APIP by 2008 (56 of which were early enough to have college outcomes). Because 
donor preferences determine the schools that will adopt the program in any given year, among 
interested schools donor availability and preferences are the primary reasons for variation in the 
timing of program implementation.
 18 To quote the Vice President of AP Strategies, “Many 
districts are interested in the program but there are no donors. So there is always a shortage of 
donors.” I argue that the exact timing of program adoption, within the group of willing schools, 
is orthogonal to changes in potentially confounding school characteristics. I test this assumption 
empirically in section VI and show that it is likely valid.  
 
III. Theoretical  Framework 
  In this section I provide a theoretical framework within which  think about how the APIP 
may affect AP course and exam taking, college going, and subsequent college performance. 
III.1  Effect on AP Course and Exam Taking: 
Student  AP output is a function of student and 
teacher effort in  AP courses and exams.  Under the  APIP, teacher pay is  more closely tied to the 
AP output of their students and the gains to a student of taking and doing  well on  AP exams are 
greater.  W here  good   perfor mance  on  rewarded tasks is  more likely  w ith  higher teacher  and 
                                                 
16 For example:  The first ten Dallas schools were chosen based on proximity to AP strategies; ST Microelectronics 
is located in the Carrolton-Farmers community and funded this district’s schools; The Priddy Foundation  
specifically requested the Burkburnett and City View schools; anonymous donors specifically requested Amarillo 
and Pflugerville schools; The Dell foundation (headquartered in Austin) funds the Austin and Houston programs; 
The remaining Dallas schools were funded by the O’Donnell foundation to complete the funding of Dallas ISD.  
17 The seven schools to adopt the APIP in 2008, however, decided to have the pre-AP preparation portion of the 
program in place for at least a year before the rewards were provided. 
18 For example, in 2005 four high-schools were chosen by The Michael and Susan Dell Foundation from a list of 
seven willing Houston schools. The remaining three schools may adopt the program at a later date. 9 
 
student  effort,  econom ic  agents (in this  case, teachers  and  students)  w ill  exert  more  effort to 
i mprove such output (Hol mstrom  and  M ilgrom  1991). Therefore, one  would expect (A) increases 
in teacher recruit ment efforts to  AP courses, (B) increases in teacher effort to i mprove instruction 
quality, (C) increases in  AP exam  taking, (D) increases in student effort on  AP exams, and (E) 
increases in  AP course enroll ment. 
 
  W ith  fully  rational  students,  full  infor mation,  no  supply  constraints,  and  functioning 
credit  markets, the small financial rewards for students of $100-$500 for taking  AP courses and 
passing  AP exams should have little effect because students  w ill balance the  lifeti me benefits to 
taking  AP courses against the i mmediate costs.  However, the cash incentives  may produce large 
effects if students are  myopic, discouraged by their peers and teachers, or credit constrained.   
III.2  Effect on College Going: Because the APIP likely increases the number of AP exams 
students pass, these students may be more desirable candidates and would therefore be more 
likely to be admitted to college. Also, students can earn scholarships based on their AP 
performance and can obtain college credit for passing AP scores ─ reducing the direct costs of 
college attendance and therefore increasing enrollment. While the APIP should increase college 
going, conditional on applying for college, the APIP could affect students’ college application 
decisions for two reasons. First, because the APIP provides information to students about the 
benefits to taking APs, the program may provide a signal that college is attainable and important 
such that affected students are more likely to apply. Second, the decision to attend college is an 
investment under uncertainty. One of the potential benefits of the APIP is to expose students to 
college-level material, thus providing information to students about the desirability of college 
and their likelihood of success in college.
19 If students are pessimistic/optimistic about their 
chances of success at college, the APIP may lead them to adjust their expected costs and benefits 
of attending college so that they may be more/less likely to apply.
20 In sum, the total effect 
reflects a combination of the effect on  college application behaviors and the effect on being 
                                                 
19 This idea is similar to Costrell (1993), who models the information value of matriculating in college to learn ones 
suitability. He argues that this could explain the low college completion rates among certain populations.   
20 Findings by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2009) suggest the latter is more likely. One implication of this 
information story is that changes in college application behaviors may reflect an optimal response to new 
information – such that reductions in the likelihood of applying to college need not be a bad outcome per se. 10 
 
admitted to college conditional on applying. While the APIP should increase the college going of 
college applicants, the total effect on college going is ambiguous in sign.    
III.3  Effect on College Performance: The APIP increases student exposure to more rigorous 
material either through (1) increased AP participation, (2) increased effort in AP courses, or (3) 
by improvements in the quality of AP courses. As such, the APIP could have positive effects on 
college outcomes even with no increase in AP participation. The APIP should increase student 
knowledge, which should be associated with improved academic outcomes. All else equal, if the 
APIP only affects students through these three mechanisms, APIP exposure should be associated 
with improved college outcomes. I refer to this as the human capital mechanism. 
However, the APIP may not improve student college outcomes: First, there is evidence 
that test scores can be improved by increasing test taking effort (Braun and Kirsch 2008), having 
a good meal (Figlio and Winicki 2005) or gaining familiarity with the test. As such, the increase 
in AP exams passed may not reflect increased knowledge so that APIP students may not perform 
any better in college than non-APIP students while in college. Second, a psychology literature 
suggests that students may be sapped of their intrinsic motivation as a result of being exposed to 
monetary incentives (Kohn 1999, Deci and Ryan 1985, Cameron and Pierce 1994)., so that APIP 
students may actually perform worse in college than students who were never offered rewards. 
Third, improved AP performance may come at the expense of other important skills if teachers 
teach-to-the-test or students neglect their non-AP courses. Fourth, the APIP may make students 
overly ambitious such that they apply to more difficult programs than they would otherwise and 
have worse outcomes as a result. That is, the APIP could lead to a sort of “mismatch”
21 between 
students and colleges that may ultimately lead to worse outcomes.
22  
   In sum, while a human capital explanation suggests that the APIP would improve college 
outcomes, the APIP could lead to worse outcomes so that the overall effect of the APIP on long-
run college outcomes is an empirical question. 
 
IV.  The APIP Schools and The Data 
To show how APIP schools differ from other schools in Texas, I present school level 
                                                 
21 Under the “mismatch” hypothesis students who wouldn't ordinarily be admitted to selective schools may be 
inadequately prepared, so that they would fare better at schools better matched to their preparation (Summers 1970)
. 
22 This mismatch hypothesis is counter to the information story – such that affected students are more likely to make 
sub-optimal college going decisions.   
 11 
 
summary statistics from the National Center for Education Statistics and the Texas Education 
Agency (TEA) in Table 1. Schools that were selected for the APIP were different from schools 
that have not been selected and may never be selected for the APIP. The APIP schools had 
average enrollments during 2000 through 2005 of 1836 students compared to 751 students for 
non-APIP schools in Texas. During these years, 74 percent of the APIP schools were in a large 
or mid-sized city compared to under 20 percent for non-APIP schools. During these years, only 
25 percent of students at APIP schools were white compared to 53 percent for non-APIP schools, 
and 10 percent of students were limited English proficient at APIP schools compared to less than 
4 percent for other schools. Both groups, however, have similar shares of economically 
disadvantaged students, reflecting the fact that Texas has both urban, and rural poor.  
The regression data used combines student records from every public tertiary institution 
in Texas
23  between 1995 and 2010 and every private institution in Texas between 2003 and 
2010
24 from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board with student-level high-school and 
middle-school data (including standardized 10th grade test scores that all students must take by 
state law) from the TEA for the years 1994 through 2007. AP exam data come from the College 
Board. 
25 The standardized test scores are normalized and standardized to be mean zero with unit 
variance for each test administration. For each student, I use the most recent administration of 
the test (i.e the year directly preceding expected exposure to the APIP).
26 The final dataset 
contains college outcomes, high-school, and middle-school data of all students who were in 10
th 
grade  between 1994 and 2007. Using the population of 10
th graders allows me to account for 




I present the pre and post APIP adoption summary statistics for the schools that will have 
adopted the APIP by 2008 (note: schools adopt the APIP at different times so that the pre-
adoption years differ across schools).  About 22.9 percent of students who were in 10th grade 
                                                 
23 In Texas there are 145 institutions of higher learning. Of the public institutions, there are 35 universities, 50 
community colleges, 9 health related institutions, 4 technical colleges and 3 state colleges. On the private side, there 
are 39 universities, 2 junior colleges and 3 heath related institutions. 
24 Because private school data are only available after 2003, I have run all models using only those cohorts that 
would have expected high school graduation after 2003 and the results are largely the same.  
25 TAKS (1994-2003) and TASP (2003-2007). 
26 The 10
th grade retention rate was about 7% in Texas in 1995, among minorities this figure is over 10 percent.  
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/reports/1996cmprpt/04retain.html 
27 For example, if the APIP caused student to drop out of high school in 11
th grade before the 11
th grade enrolment 
data are collected, then using the population of 11
th graders at will yield results that suffer from attrition bias. Basing 
all estimates on the population of 10
th graders before potential exposure to the APIP avoids such bias. 12 
 
during the pre-adoption years  took an AP course while in high school compared to 30.4 percent 
in the post adoption period. There were similar increases in AP examination taking where those 
in 10th grade during the pre-period took 0.097 exams and those in the post period took 0.127 
exams during their high school career. The 10th grade math and reading standardized scores 
were below zero for both periods─ indicating that the APIP schools were low achievement 
schools on average. Also, these scores were slightly lower after adoption than before - suggesting 
possible negative selection into APIP schools.  
The average student before adoption was in 10th grade in 1999 compared to 2003 for the 
post adoption sample. As such, variables that increase with age such as college attendance and 
completion are difficult to compare without directly taking age into account (as is done the 
regression analysis). However, to allow for a simple comparison, I compute enrolment by the 
time since expected high school graduation. About 35, 46, and 53 percent of 10th graders in the 
pre-treatment cohorts were a freshman in college within 1, 2, and 3 years of expected high school 
graduation respectively. The 10th graders in post adoption cohorts were more likely to attend 
college such that  41, 50, and 56 percent of 10th graders in the post-treatment cohorts were a 
freshman in college within 1, 2 and 3 years of expected high school graduation, respectively.
28 
The implied sophomore year persistence (the share of students who were sophomores divided by 
the share who were freshmen) is 0.53 and 0.544 for the pre- and post-adoption cohorts, 
respectively.
29 Comparing figures for ever being a freshman to the enrolment figures above 
reveal that 59, 79, and 89 percent of college going occurs within one, two and three years of 
expected high-school graduation, respectively. Because analyzing enrolment within four years of 
expected high-school graduation ignores enrolment that occur after four years (one tenth of the 
variation), I analyze eventual enrolment and control for cohort differences directly.     
 
V. Empirical  Strategy 
  Before presenting the identification strategy, In section V.1, I discuss methodological 
concerns facing this and similar studies and I present my proposed solutions. In section V.2, I 
present the identification strategy and discuss the source of plausibly exogenous variation.  
                                                 
28 Texas has the second largest and well developed community college system in the United States so that a sizable 
share of these students enroll in 2-year colleges. 
29 The sophomore variables are not computed for the 2007 cohort, because they would be freshman in 2010 if they 
enrolled directly after expected high-school graduation. Also, college graduation variables are only computed for 
cohorts before 2004 because subsequent cohorts would not typically have graduated from a 4-year college by 2010.  13 
 
V.1  Methodological Issues:  Because the APIP affects students in 11
th and 12
th grade, it 
affects the characteristics of students while still in high school so that one must compare students 
who were similar before exposure to the APIP. As such, I compare the outcomes of students with 
similar attributes before exposure to APIP from the same high-school and do not control for 
potentially endogenous covariates such as SAT scores or high-school GPA.
 30 
Other important methodological issues are the choice of population and how the 
outcomes are defined. If the APIP increases college going, the population of college students 
who were exposed to the APIP may have worse outcomes merely because APIP-exposed 
students will have a higher proportion of marginal (and likely less well-prepared) college 
attendees. Using the sample of college attendees leads to sample selection bias. To avoid this, I 
compare the outcomes of all potential college students. Basing the estimates on prospective 
college students allows one to uncover the true causal effect, but introduces the methodological 
issue that changes in outcomes such as sophomore year persistence and GPA may reflect effects 
through increased college enrolment and effects due to changes for students who would have 
enrolled in college absent the APIP (effects conditional on college entry).  
  While it is impossible to identify those who would have attended college absent the APIP 
I use three approaches to estimate of the effect of the APIP conditional on college entry. The first 
approach is to impute outcome values for students who do not enroll in college. Specifically, I 
predict freshman year GPA and sophomore year enrollment as a function of observable pre-
treatment characteristics and use the predicted values for those who do not enroll in college. The 
second approach is a control function methodology. Specifically, following Angrist (1995) I use 
the sample of college enrollees, while controlling for the estimated likelihood of attending 
college (estimated using the full sample).
31 The third approach is to trim the data following Lee 
(2002) to obtain a lower-bound estimate of the effect for those who would have enrolled in 
college absent the APIP.
32  
The final methodological issue is how treatment is defined. Because students may enroll 
                                                 
30 Many studies mistakenly control for endogenous variables to isolate the casual effect of AP exams are 
(Geiser and 
Santelices 2004, Ei mers 2003)
. However, Dougherty, Mellor and Jian (2006)
 control for 8 th grade test scores. 
 
31 I estimate a probit model of attending college on all control variables and obtain an estimated propensity. 
32 One estimates the proportion X of the treated group that attends college because of the APIP. Under the extreme 
assumption that the marginal enrollees have the best outcomes, one ranks the treated sample by the outcome and 
removes the top X percent of the treated sample. Estimates using the trimmed sample of college enrollees will yield 
a lower-bound estimate of the effect conditional on enrolling.    14 
 
at APIP schools in 11
th and 12
th grade to benefit from the program, defining treatment based on 
actual school enrollment in 11
th and 12
th grade could be subject to self-selection bias. To avoid 
such bias, I use intention-to-treat instead of whether a student is actually affected by the APIP. 
Specifically, I define intention-to-treatment (ITT) based on whether a student would be treated if 
they remain in their 10
th grade high school and are never held back a grade. For example, a 
student is intended for treatment if they are enrolled at a school in 10
th grade in year t, and the 
school will have adopted the APIP by year t+2. The benefit of using ITT is that it is not 
endogenously determined by student selection into APIP schools in 11
th and 12
th grade, or 
subject to biases due to attrition or retention.
33 Using ITT yields a clean policy-relevant estimate 
of the effect of introducing the APIP on the target population. 
V.2  Identification Strategy: The identification strategy is to compare the difference in college 
outcomes across cohorts of students who attended the same high-school before and after APIP 
adoption to the difference in college outcomes between cohorts of students at schools that did not 
adopt the APIP over the same time period. Comparing students from the same high school 
addresses the concern that students at schools that adopt the APIP may differ from students who 
attend schools that do not adopt the APIP. By comparing cohorts, as opposed to students within 
cohorts, I address the concern that certain types of students tend to take AP courses and exams 
for unobserved reasons while others do not. Furthermore, by comparing the college outcomes of 
students with the same 10
th grade test scores and demographics, I address the concern that the 
incoming preparation of students may have changed in APIP schools after adoption of the 
program. Finally, this approach helps to account for potentially confounding statewide policies.
34 
This strategy relies on the assumption that the difference in outcomes across cohorts for 
comparison schools is the same, in expectation, as the difference in outcomes across cohorts that 
adopting schools would have experienced if they had not adopted the APIP. For this to be 
plausible, the comparison schools must be similar to APIP adopting schools. To ensure that this 
is the case, I restrict the estimation sample to those schools that had adopted the APIP by 2008 – 
using the change in outcomes for other APIP schools that did not yet have the opportunity to 
implement the program as the counterfactual change in outcomes. This sample restriction has 
                                                 
33 The downside of this measure is that it will not capture the full effect of the treatment on the treated since (1) 
students who leave APIP schools after 10
th grade will not be treated but will be intended for treatment, (2) students 
who enter APIP schools after 10
th grade will be treated but will not be intended for treatment, and (3) retained 
students, who should have graduated before APIP adoption, will be treated but will not be intended for treatment. 
34 For a description of such policies see the Appendix Note 2. 15 
 
two important benefits: (1) because APIP willing schools are observationally similar, they likely 
share common time shocks and (2) because APIP willing schools are similarly motivated and 
interested, restricting the sample in this way avoids comparing schools with motivated principals 
to schools with unmotivated principals who have no interest in the program.
35  
Because I do not compare schools that adopt the APIP to those that do not, using a within 
school estimation strategy controls for school selection on unobserved time invariant 
characteristics such as time-constant school enthusiasm or motivation. Identification relies on the 
assumption that the timing of APIP implementation is exogenous to other within-school changes.  
Since the timing of actual adoption relies on idiosyncratic donor preferences and availability, this 
assumption is plausible. However, because donor choices are not random, I cannot entirely rule 
out that the timing of adoption is uncorrelated with changes in school characteristics. As such, to 
assuage concern that timing of adoption may be endogenous, I identify those schools where 
donors had prior relationships and verify that all the main results are robust to excluding these 
schools.
36 Also, in section VI, I show that improvements only take place after APIP adoption, 
and the timing of adoption is unrelated to other school changes or the timing of the arrival of a 
new principal - suggesting the assumption of exogenous timing of adoption is valid.  
This within-school cohort-based comparison is implemented by estimating the following 
equation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 




ich i i k ITT year k h c ich
k




         
In [1],  ich Y  is the outcome of student i in 10
th grade cohort c, from high school h.  i X  is a matrix 
of student demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and free-lunch status in 10th grade. 
i A is a vector of student achievement scores from 10
th grade. To control for differences in 
student attributes across high-schools, changes in performance over time, and differences in 
outcomes across cohorts, I include high-school fixed effects  h  , and cohort fixed effects  c  . The 
variable of interest    ITT year k I   is an indicator variable denoting the ITT year, so that  1   is the 
effect of the APIP in its first intention to treat year and  k   is the effect of the APIP in its k
th 
                                                 
35 Some schools adopt the APIP after 2007 and are therefore never treated in-sample for the purposes of analyzing 
college outcomes but serve as comparison schools. The results are similar (albeit less precise) when using only 
schools that adopt the APIP in-sample so the findings are not driven by the particular choice of comparison schools. 
36 For a detailed discussion see Appendix Note 1. 16 
 
intention to treat year. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level.  
  It is important to point out that a simple before/after comparison likely understates the 
full effect of the APIP because the first affected cohort (ITT year=1) is exposed to the two-year 
program for only one year. As such, the first cohort to receive the "full treatment" is the second 
cohort (ITTyear=2). Because there are likely learning-by-doing effects, and it may take time for 
the AP program to mature, outcomes may continue to improve beyond the second cohort. As 
such, I estimate dynamic treatment effects in addition to a simple before and after comparison. 
To identify the dynamic APIP effect, I use four binary variables denoting the first, second, third, 
and fourth plus intention-to-treatment years. For example, the first ITT cohort for a school has 
ITT year=1 and the 3
rd ITT cohort for a school has ITT year=3, so that ITT year denoted how 
long the APIP had been in place when the student was expected to graduate from high school. 
For example, if the APIP was adopted in school h in the 2002-03 school year, the 10
th grade 
cohort for the school year 2000-01 would be coded as ITT year=1, while the 10
th grade cohort 
for the school year 2002-03 would be coded as ITT year=3).    
 
VI. Results 
VI.1   Graphical Evidence: Before showing the regression results, it is helpful to present some 
visual evidence. Figure 2 shows the results of estimating a flexible version of equation [1], where 
I estimate effects for both pre-adoption years and post adoption years. For each outcome, I plot 
the estimated coefficients of ITT years -5 through 4 (the first year of adoption is year 0). For AP 
course taking, AP exam passing, and freshman year enrollment, there is a clear increase after 
APIP adoption. However, there is some visual evidence of upward trends in AP course taking 
and college enrollment (I test for trending formally below). For the longer-run outcomes, 
freshman year GPA, sophomore year enrollment, and sophomore year persistence (being a 
sophomore conditional on ever being freshman) there is clear visual evidence of improved 
outcomes after APIP adoption and little evidence of pre-existing trends. The improved outcomes 
conditional on college entry are evidence irrespective of how one accounts for sample selection.  
  To test for trending formally, I test the null hypothesis that the pre-adoption year effects 
differ from the first pre-adoption year, and I fail to reject at the 5 percent level for all outcomes. 
In contrast, for all outcomes, the test that the post-adoption years differ from the year prior to 
adoption is rejected at the 1 percent level ─ statistical evidence of an APIP effect (including 17 
 
conditional on college enrollment) that is not driven by underlying trends. Moreover, in section 
VI.4, I show that the main findings are robust to including school-specific linear trends. 
VI.2   Effects on AP outcomes and college enrollment: Table 3 presents the regression results 
for AP outcomes, and college enrollment. In the top panel, I report the coefficient on the simple 
before/after adoption indicator and in the lower panel I report the coefficients on the first, 
second, third and fourth plus intention-to-treat years. For AP course taking (column 1) a there is 
a statistically significant 0.165 increase (about a 21 percent increase) in year three, but a 
statistically insignificant 7.4 percent increase in year four and beyond. Even though the simple 
before/after coefficient is not statistically significant, the null hypothesis that all the dynamic 
APIP effect are zero is rejected at the 5 percent level ─ indicating that the APIP does increase 
AP course taking. Columns 2 and 3 show that the increases AP exam taking and passing and that 
this effect increases over time. The adoption indicator and all the ITT treatment year dummies 
are statistically significant and by the fourth year the APIP is associated with a  0.098 increase 
(about a 100% increase) in the number of AP exams taken, and a 0.043 increase (about a 45% 
increase) in the number of AP exams passed.  The increases are primarily in the English and 
Science AP exams (Appendix Table 4). It is important to point out that the APIP may affect 
unmeasured outcomes (such as aspirations or self-confidence) that could affect college outcomes 
but may not be reflected in these AP outcomes. As such, while these AP effects are important, 
they may not measure all of the APIP effects and should therefore not be used to scale the effects 
on college outcomes as if it were a "first stage".    
  Columns 4,5, and 6 show the effect on the likelihood of ever being a freshman in any 
college, a two-year college, and a four-year college, respectively. The before/after comparisons 
show that the APIP increases college going by about 4.2 percentage points on average and that 
this is driven by both two-year and four-year college going. The dynamic effects show that the 
effect of the APIP increases over time, so that by the fourth year of the APIP college going 
overall increases by 4.8 percentage points (an 8 percent increase), four year college going 
increases by 2.8 percentage points (a 16 percent increase) and two year college going by a 
statistically insignificant 2 percentage points (a 5 percent increase). Also, there were small 18 
 
statistically insignificant increases in college selectivity among college goers (not shown).
37 
  Because the outcomes analyzed are using Texas college data, it is important to ensure 
that  increased college enrolment does not reflect shifting of college going from out-of-state to 
in-state. I test this directly using data from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) for the 
10th grade cohorts of 2005 and 2006. These data measure college enrollment both at in-state and 
out-of-state colleges and universities. Because I only have NSC data for two cohorts,  I can only 
estimate effects for the first and second ITT cohorts. The results in columns 7 and 8 show that by 
the second ITT year the APIP increases in-state college going by 3.5 percentage points 
(significant at the 5 percent level) but has no effect on out-of-state college going (a point 
estimate of -0.0001 that is not close to statistical significance in the second ITT year). These 
results are similar to those obtained using the THECB data (for all years and also for these two 
cohorts) thus validating the college going numbers from the THECB data and showing that the 
enrollment effects measured in this study reflect real increases in college going and are not 
confounded with changes in out-of state college going. 
IV.3  Effects on Freshman GPA: In columns 1 through 3 of table 4, I present the effect on 
Freshman year GPA conditional on college enrollment. In models of college enrollees that 
include the estimated propensity scores to account for selection to college (column 3), treated 
cohorts had freshman year GPAs that were 0.03 points higher (significant at the 10 percent 
level). This GPA effect increases over time so that GPAs were 0.067 points higher in the fourth 
treated cohort than in untreated cohorts (significant at the 5 percent level). Using all students and 
imputing GPAs for non-enrollees (based on observable characteristics) yields a before/after 
effect of 0.015 points (significant at the 5 percent level), and a fourth year effect of 0.031 grade 
points (significant at the 1 percent level). I also implemented a trimming procedure to obtain a 
lower bound effect. However, the lower-bound effect is large negative, and therefore 
uninformative and not presented in the table. To shed further light on how much of the APIP 
effect is driven by the extensive margin (college entry) as opposed to the intensive margin (GPA 
conditional on enrolling in college), in Figure 3, I present the coefficient on the simple post 
adoption indicator variable using the full sample under different imputed GPA values for those 
who do not attend college. If one assumes students who do not enroll in college would have 
                                                 
37 I linked the college identifiers for college enrollees to the mean SAT scores of admitted students from IPEDS. 
Treated cohort attended colleges with slightly higher SAT scores. The increase in the 25th percentile of combined 
math and reading SAT scores was 32 points (not statistically significant).  19 
 
received a GPAs of 0, 1, and 2 (an F, D, and C average, respectively) then the before/after effects 
would be 0.048, 0.034, and 0.021 grade points, respectively. If one makes the unrealistic 
assumption that non-enrollees would have had the same GPA as those who did enroll (2.3 about 
a C+ average) the adoption effect would be 0.017 grade points (significant at the 5 percent level).  
In fact, the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimated APIP effect to includes zero for all 
assumed values below 2.7 (a B- average), the point estimates are positive until an assumed GPA 
of 3.6 (an A- average), and is essentially zero (-0.006) if one assumes that non-enrollees would 
have had a 4.0 (straight As). Figure 3 shows that under reasonable assumptions of what the 
GPAs would have been for non-enrollees, APIP exposure is associated with improved freshman 
year GPAs conditional on college enrollment. 
  To provide a sense of where in the achievement distribution these improvements in 
freshman GPA might come from, Figure 4 presents cumulative densities of the freshman GPA of 
treated and untreated cohorts. It is evident that there are slight improvements in GPA for treated 
cohorts below the 40th percentile (GPA between 0 and 2), but that the 40th through 90th 
percentiles are clearly higher in the treated group (corresponding to GPAs between 2 and 4). This 
suggests that much of the improved GPAs came from student between the 40th and 90th 
percentile of the achievement distribution in college who would have had averages between a C 
and an A- without the APIP.   
IV.4  Effect on sophomore year enrollment and persistence: Most college attrition occurs in 
the first year so that persistence through the first year is a key predictor of college success. In 
Table 4 I present the effect on being a college sophomore and persisting to sophomore year 
(enrolled as a college sophomore conditional on ever being a college freshman). Column 4 
shows the results for the full sample, and columns 5,6,7 and 8 show the results conditional on 
college enrollment with no sample selection correction, with propensity scores, with imputed 
values for non-enrollees, and the lower-bound trimming effect, respectively.  
  APIP adoption is associated with a 3 percentage point increase in ever being a college 
sophomore on average, and a 6 percentage point increase for the fourth ITT cohort and beyond. 
All estimates of the effect conditional on college enrolment yield pooled adoption effects of 
about 2.5 percentage points and fourth year effects between 5.5 and 8.6 percentage points (all 
significant at the 1 percent level). Given a base persistence rate of 52 percent, these increases 
represent increases between a 10 and 17 percent. The results that trim to top GPA earners in the 20 
 
treated sample for a lower-bound effect yield a statistically insignificant pooled effect of 1 
percentage point, but a 6.6 percentage point increase by year four (significant at the 5 percent 
level). These results show real increases in sophomore year attendance, due, in large part, to  
increased persistence for those who would have enrolled in college absent the APIP.  
  Another way to obtain a lower-bound persistence effect is to make the extreme 
assumption that all the marginal freshman enrollees would persist to sophomore year (Dynarski 
2008). The average persistence rate is 0.52 so this is unlikely. The fourth year freshman and 
sophomore enrollment effects are 4.8 and 6 percentage points, respectively. If all the marginal 
enrollees would have persisted, this leaves 6-4.8 = 1.2 percentage points that must be due to the 
non-marginal students. As such, even under the lower-bound assumption, the APIP increases 
college persistence conditional on college enrolment by at least 2.3 percent by year four. A more 
realistic, but still conservative, assumption is that the marginal student would persist at the same 
rate as the average student. Under this assumption 4.8*0.52= 2.5 percent may be due to marginal 
enrollees, so that 6-2.5=3.5 percentage points is due to the infra-marginal students (yielding a 6.7 
percent increase in sophomore year persistence conditional on enrolling).  
Timing of the Enrollment effect: Readers may wonder if these enrollment effect merely reflect 
that the APIP causes students to enroll in school sooner. To assess this, I analyze enrollment 
within 1,2,3 and 4 years of expected high school graduation in Table 5. If the effects were due to 
students enrolling in school sooner rather than later, one would see stronger effects on 
enrollment close to high school graduation and no effect within longer time horizons. For 
example, if students attended college within one year of high-school graduation rather than two 
or three, one would see effects on "ever a freshman within 1 year of high-school graduation" but 
would see no effect on "ever a freshman within 4 years of high-school graduation". The effects 
on freshman enrollment and sophomore enrollment grow as one looks to longer time horizons, 
which is exactly what one would see if the effect reflects increased college going overall, and is 
inconsistent with the results being due to shifting to earlier college entry. This also indicates that 
much of the increased college going occurs after four years after expected high school 
graduation, so that analyzing short run college going would miss an important part of the story. 
   
VI.5  Threats to Validity and Endogeneity Concerns: While I am careful to compare cohorts 
within the same school to avoid self-selection within a cohort and selection across schools, and I 21 
 
limit the estimation sample to only the APIP schools that are of similar motivation, there are a 
few remaining endogeneity concerns regarding whether the estimates reflect a true causal 
relationship. I address these in this section. 
The timing of APIP adoption may be endogenous. There is the concern that schools that had an 
increase in motivation were more likely to apply to have the APIP implemented. The APIP takes 
about two full years to be implemented after a school expresses interest. As such, if the results 
merely reflected changes in school motivation that coincided with expressing interest in the 
APIP, one should see an improvement in outcomes two years prior to adoption. There is no 
visually evidence of this and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of improvements in outcomes 
before adoption. As a direct test of the "timing of interest" hypothesis, I regressed the outcomes 
on the two-year lag of adoption. This yielded very small coefficient estimates and p-values larger 
than 0.4 for all outcomes.  
To provide further evidence that the timing of APIP adoption is exogenous, I predict 
having a new high school principal as a function of whether program will be adopted in 3 years, 
2 years, 1 year, or was adopted in the same year. These models include school fixed effects and 
year fixed effects only. In each of these 4 regressions (shown in appendix Table 4) the p-values 
associated with the null hypothesis of no systematic relationship is larger than 0.2. I also estimate 
a specification similar to equation (1) and find no effect on subsequent principal turnover 
(Appendix Table 6). This is consistent with assertions that timing of adoption is idiosyncratic, 
and suggests that adoption is likely exogenous to changes in schools over time. 
High-ability, motivated students may self-select into APIP schools after adoption.  Another 
concern is that these improvements are the result of motivated students self-selecting into 
secondary schools that adopt the APIP.
38 If there were positive selection driving the results, the 
APIP should be associated with characteristics associated with better outcomes. To test for this I 
predict the main outcomes as a function of observable student characteristics before APIP 
                                                 
38 This is a potential problem because there is the possibility of selective migration. While none of the treated 
districts allow students from outside the district to enroll, the large urban school districts in Texas (Dallas, Houston, 
and Austin) practice intradistrict choice where students have the option to attend their neighborhood school, or 
another school in the district (including magnet and charter schools) subject to space limitations at the receiving 
school. Because Houston and Austin schools do not adopt the APIP until 2007, this only poses a problem for Dallas 
schools. To further ensure that selective migration does not drive the results, I estimate the APIP effect without 
Dallas schools and the results are similar. In is also worth noting that under No Child Left Behind, students 
attending a Title I school designated as "in need of improvement" have the right to attend a higher-performing 
school in the district. However in most districts the APIP school are the lower performing schools.  22 
 
adoption. I then regress the predicted outcomes on the adoption indicator variables, school 
effects, and year effects. If there were selection on observable characteristics, APIP adoption 
would have an effect on these predicted outcomes. For all the predicted outcomes the point 
estimates are close to zero and the p-value associated with the hypothesis that the adoption year 
variables are correlated with the predicted outcomes are above 0.4 (Table 6).
39 To assuage any 
concerns that the results are driven by controlling for selection I show that results that that 
exclude student controls (Appendix Table 1) are similar to those in Table 3.    
There may be selection in unobserved dimensions. To ensure that the results are not driven by 
selective migration on unobservable characteristics I estimate equation [1] while including 
indicator variables for each middle-school by high-school combination. Students that self-select 
into high school because of the APIP, will come from middle schools that are not the natural 
feeder middle schools for the APIP schools (if they were, there would be no need to select). I can 
avoid comparing the outcomes of students who do self-select to APIP schools from non-feeder 
middle schools to those of students who attended the natural feeder middle schools and did not 
self-select by making inferences based on the within middle-school-by-high-school variation. 
That is, only compare the outcomes of students who attended the same middle school and the 
same high school so that variation in treatment cannot arise from differences in students' 
potentially endogenous choice of school. Furthermore, I remove all students who attended 
middle schools that sent fewer than 300 students to any given APIP high school during the 
sample period. This removes almost all potential for bias from student selection. The results 
(Appendix Table 1) are  similar to the results in Table 3─ again, suggesting no selection. 
APIP schools were already on a trajectory of improvement before adoption. The visual 
evidence shows and the test for pre-existing trends indicate that the results are not driven by 
underlying trends. However, it is instructive to see that the results are robust to including high-
school trends. I augment the main estimation model to include both a high-school specific 
intercept and a linear time trend for each high school (Appendix Table 1). While less precise,  
the estimates are similar to those in Table 3 with the exception of AP course taking, where the 
estimated effect is larger with the inclusion of a linear time trend for each high-school.  
The benefits of the APIP are driven by general improvements in schools. One may wonder if 
                                                 
39 I also present effects on individual covariates in columns 1 through 6 which indicate that treated cohorts had lower 
10th grade test scores, were less likely to be low income and less likely to be Hispanic. While there are these 
differences, overall treated students had very similar predicted outcomes as untreated students. 23 
 
the benefits to the APIP are driven by improvements in or increased effort in the AP program, or 
due to other school-wide changes (such as better inputs, or change in teaching philosophy) that 
might have been affected by APIP adoption. If improved outcomes are driven by improved AP 
instruction, increased AP participation, or both, one should see large effects for students who 
take AP courses and little effect for students who do not. I test this by comparing the effect of the 
APIP on students who are ex-ante (based on pre-adoption characteristics) likely and unlikely to 
take AP courses (Figure 5).
40 While one cannot reject the null hypothesis of no adoption effect 
for those with estimated likelihood below 0.33 at the 10 percent level, there are large statistically 
significant APIP effects for students with estimated likelihood above 0.66. This suggests that (a) 
the benefits of the APIP are experienced by AP students and (b) the estimated effects are not 
driven by other confounding changes at schools. 
  As an additional test, I look at the APIP effect on school-level outcomes that should not 
be affected by the APIP as a falsification exercise. Appendix Table 5 shows the effect of APIP 
adoption on high-school graduation, teacher turnover, total school expenditures, the number of 
teachers, teacher experience, and average class size. By the fourth year of APIP adoption the 
only outcome for which there is a statistically significant effect is the number of AP teachers - 
consistent with an expansion of the AP program.  For all other outcomes, there is no significant 
effect, suggesting that the estimated effects are not due to general improvements in schools.  
VI.5  Effects by Gender and Ethnicity. In light of a literature showing larger positive treatment 
effects for females than for males (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007, Jackson 2009, Hastings, Kane 
and Staiger 2006, Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy forthcoming), one 
wonders if there is response heterogeneity by gender. Also, 
K lopfenstein (2004) documents large 
differences in  AP participation across ethnic groups both across  and  w ithin schools so that there 
may  be  differences  by  ethnicity. 
As such, I estimate equation [1] with the inclusion of 
interactions of the ITT year indicator variables with "female", "black", "Hispanic", and "other-
ethnicity" indicator variables.  I report the adoption variables and their interactions in Table 8. 
  In general the estimated effects are larger for females than for males, however these 
differences are not large. Of the 10 outcomes analyzed, only for two of them does one reject the 
                                                 
40 I estimate a probit model of the likelihood that a student takes at least one AP course based on all observed pre-
treatment covariates. I then put those with estimated propensities higher than 0.66 into the highly likely group and 
those with estimated propensities below 0.33 in the low propensity group.   24 
 
null hypothesis that there are gender differences in response at the 10 percent level. Specifically, 
females have a smaller increase in AP courses taken and about a 50 percent larger increase in 
overall college going by the fourth APIP year. For all outcomes conditional of college entry, the 
result are similar for males and females, such that while females were more likely to enroll in 
college due to the APIP, the effect on their college outcomes are similar. 
  Before  analyzing  differences  by  ethnicity,  I  present  summary  statistics in  Table  7  for 
white,  black, and  H ispanic students.  About  23  percent  of  black  10th  graders in the sample take 
any  AP course, only 3.4 percent take any  AP exams and the average number of exams passed is 
0.009.  Si m ilar to  black students,  about  21  percent  of  H ispanic  10th  graders in the sample take 
any  AP course, only 3.9 percent take any  AP exams and the average number of exams passed is 
0.021. In contrast, about 35 percent of  white 10th graders take any  AP course, 10.6 percent take 
any  AP  exams,  and  the  average  number  of  exams  passed  is  0.113.  Not  surprisingly,  these 
differences in  AP  outcomes  are  associated  w ith  differences in  college  outcomes.  The  college 
going rates for blacks,  H ispanics, and  whites are 56.6, 44.5, and 77.3 percent, respectively.  Even 
conditional on enrolling, there are differences so the freshman year  GPAs for blacks,  H ispanics, 
and  whites  were  2.07,  2.32,  and  2.6,  respectively.  It  is  worth  noting  that  some  of  these 
differences  may reflect  differences in  preparation as  black and  H ispanic  10th  graders  had  math 
and reading test scores bet ween 0.4 and 0.5 standard deviations lower than  whites on average.  
  The  results in  Table  8  reveal  differences  across  ethnic  groups.  W hile there  are  small 
differences in  AP course taking and  AP exam  taking,  one rejects that the  APIP response is the 
same bet ween  white, black and  H ispanic students at the 5 percent level for college going,  GPA  
and  persistence to  sophomore  year.  G iven the large  differences in  baseline  AP  outcomes, the 
increases in  AP exam  taking represent a near doubling of  AP exam  taking for  whites an increase 
by  a factor  of  2.5 for  H ispanics  and  a  near tripling for  blacks.  The relative  differences for  AP 
exam  passing are even  more dramatic; a 34 percent increase for  whites, a doubling for  H ispanics 
and a five ti mes increase for black students. 25 
 
  The  differences  in  college  outcomes  across  ethnic  groups  reveal  some  interesting 
patterns.  W hile  black  and  white  students  experience  increases  in  college  going,  there  is  no 
increase in college-going for  H ispanics.  Looking to  GPA  conditional  on enrolling,  while  white 
students  have  little  response  in  this  outcome,  by  the  fourth  APIP  year,  black  students  have 
freshman  year  GPAs that  are  bet ween  0.138  and  0.161  higher than those  not  exposed  (these 
effect are significant at the 1 percent level).  W hile not statistically significant, the point esti mates 
suggest that  H ispanic  students  may  also  have  higher  GPAs  under the  APIP.  A ll  groups  have 
i mproved  sophomore  year  enrol ment  and  persistence  conditional  on  enroll ment,  and  the 
i mprovements are particularly pronounced for black students. In  models that use the propensity 
score  correction,  by  the  fourth  APIP  cohort,  sophomore  year  persistence  increases  by  4.85 
percentage  points  for  whites,  9.8  points  for  H ispanics,  and  13.5  points  for  blacks  (these 
differences  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1  percent  level).  However,  in  models  that  use 
i mputation to  account  for  sample  selection  bias,  by the  fourth  APIP  cohort,  sophomore  year 
persistence increases by 4.85 percentage points for  whites and  H ispanics, and 9 points for blacks 
(this differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level). In sum ,  while there are small 
differences by gender the  APIP appears to have relatively larger effects on the college outcomes 
of ethnic  m inorities, particularly black students. The pattern of results i mplies that the  APIP  may 
help narrow  educational gaps across ethnic groups.41   
VI.6  Evidence on College Graduation:  Analyzing college completion with these data is 
feasible, but results must be interpreted with caution. Most APIP schools adopted the program 
after 2000, so that those who would graduate after 2010 are classified as non-graduates in these 
data. To reduce the likelihood of classifying people still in school as non-graduates, I analyze 
                                                 
41 
G iven the differences in academ ic preparation across the ethnic groups, readers  may  wonder if these differences 
by ethnicity  merely reflect differences by incom ing academ ic preparation. To test for this, I esti mated the  main 
models that interacts indicator variables denoting  whether a student scored in the top third or bottom  third in both 
math and reading 10th grade tests  w ith the adoption variables. There  were no systematic or statistically significant 
differences by incom ing academ ic preparation, and they do not explain the differences observed by ethnicity. This 
suggests that social factors  were at play.
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college graduation for the students who were in 10th grade before 2003. These students are old 
enough to have graduated from a 4-year college by 2010. An implication of this data truncation 
problem is that I may confound reduced time to degree with increased college completion. 
However, I present evidence that this is likely not the case so that this truncation bias is likely to 
attenuate the estimates and understate the effects of the APIP on graduation. 
  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 presents the main specification where the outcomes are 
graduating with any degree, graduating with any degree within 4 years, and graduating with a 
bachelors (BA) degree. I present results for all students in the top panel, and also black, 
Hispanic, and white, separately in the lower panels. The results in the top panel show that the 
APIP has no effect on the graduation variables, on average. However, the results broken up by 
ethnicity reveal that while there are no graduation effects for whites, treated black and Hispanic 
students were more likely to earn a bachelors degree (one can reject the null hypothesis of no 
adoption effect at the 5 percent level for both groups). For black students, the first and third 
APIP cohorts are 1.8 percentage points more likely to earn a BA degree than those who were not 
exposed to the APIP, while the effect for Hispanic students increases monotonically with 
program age. By the fourth year of the APIP Hispanic students are 2.5 percentage points more 
likely to earn a BA degree. These increases represent a 20 and 31 percent increase for black and 
Hispanic students, respectively. The large effects for Hispanics are striking given the lack of a 
college enrollment effect─ indicating that this effect is all conditional on college entry. 
  To assess whether these effects reflect decreased time to degree rather than increased 
degree attainment overall, I analyze the effect of earning a degree within 4 years of expected 
high school graduation. As with the enrollment effects, if the effects were due to black and 
Hispanic students earning degrees faster, one would see stronger effects on this variable that only 
measures degree receipt close to high school graduation. That is, the effects would increase as 
we look at degree receipt within shorter time horizons and disappear as one looks to long time 
horizons. There is no effect on earning a degree within four years for any group ─ showing that 
the degree effect is not driven by students being more likely to graduate on time. In fact one has 
to look seven years out to find effects on graduation similar to those for the ever earned a BA 
degree variable. To provide further evidence that this graduation effect reflects increased 
persistence and more completed schooling (rather than shorter time to degree), I look at total 
credits earned and total credits earned within four years of expected high school graduation. 27 
 
Again, there are larger positive effects on total credits earned than on credits earned within four 
years of expected high school graduation ─ further evidence that the effects are due to increased 
schooling rather than reduced time to degree. As a final check, I look at junior year enrollment 
and junior year enrollment within four years of expected high school graduation. The pattern is 
the same; all groups have modest increases in junior year enrollment within four years and larger 
effects on ever enrolling as a junior ─ further evidence that the effect are due to increased 
schooling rather than reduced time to degree. To assuage any lingering concerns that these 
findings are due to differential trends by ethnicity, I estimated models with school-specific trends 
by ethnicity and the results are qualitatively similar.
42    
VI.8  Evidence of the Mechanisms: Having established that there is an effect of the APIP, in 
this section, I try to shed light on the underlying mechanisms with a variety of empirical tests. 
Are the improvements driven by increased supply of AP courses and sections? It is natural to 
wonder whether the improved outcomes were driven by merely an increase in the availability of 
AP courses and sections. To speak to this question I analyze the APIP effect on schools that had 
above the median number of AP sections before 1996 (schools that had no statistically 
significant growth in the number of AP sections after adoption) and those that had below the 
median (schools that experienced a statistically significant 150 percent increase in AP sections 
offered by the fourth adoption year). If the benefits of the APIP were solely due to an increase in 
the supply of AP sections one would expect large effects in the high growth schools and small 
effects in the low growth schools. Exactly the opposite is true. There are small improvements in 
college outcomes for the high growth schools and large improvements for the low growth 
schools (Figure 5) ─ indicating that increases on AP course supply do not drive the results.  
Are schools/teachers/students motivated by the incentives? If better resource utilization (caused 
by the monetary incentives) drives the success of the APIP, and effort is proportional to the size 
of the rewards, schools that paid higher powered incentives would have better outcomes than 
those that did not. To test this, I compare the adoption effect for high power schools (paid 
between $101 and $500 per exam) and low powered schools (paid $100 per exam) in Figure 5. 
While the effect on AP exam passing is similar across these school types (as found in Jackson 
                                                 
42 For visual evidence Appendix Figure A1 shows the evolution of the graduation and junior year enrollment for 
black white and Hispanic students. The F-tests on pre treatment years yield p-values 0.21, 0.36, and 0.09 for white, 
Hispanic and black students respectively, suggesting some possible trending only for black students.   
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2010), for all college outcomes, the effects are larger in the high-power schools. This suggests 
that the monetary incentives, and the increased effort they induced, were an important 
component of the success of the program.  
How important are the non-incentive aspects of the program? The improved curricula in earlier 
grades, teacher training, curricular oversight, vertical teams, and college counseling could all be 
partially responsible for the success of the APIP. Because the first cohort is only exposed to the 
APIP for one year, the first cohort to have the full incentive component of the APIP is the second 
treatment cohort. As such, if the effects are driven by incentives alone, the effects would be the 
same in the second year as all subsequent years. For most outcomes this is not the case, 
suggesting that there is learning by doing or the other components of the APIP that would take a 
few years to take effect (such as improvements in earlier grades, or changes in norms) are central 
to the effects. One can test for improvements in earlier grades by looking at the incoming 10th 
grade test scores. The results in Table 4 show that incoming test scores are slightly lower after 
adoption than before, suggesting that improvements in incoming academic preparedness is not 
the driving force. This suggests that learning-by-doing and changes in school culture are the 
likely explanation for the increases in the APIP effect over time. 
IV.9  Discussion: The large increases in AP participation are difficult to reconcile with the 
full-information full-rationality models of the schooling decision, and are more consistent with 
there being sub-optimal effort on the part of teachers and/or students or a large increase in the 
supply of AP courses. Guidance counselors at three different APIP high schools in Dallas 
indicate that there were school-wide campaigns to increase participation in AP courses after 
APIP adoption. At two of the three high schools an additional guidance counselor was hired to 
improve the school’s ability to identify those students who should be encouraged to take AP 
courses. At all three schools, the guidance counselors were given explicit instructions to identify 
those students who should be taking AP courses and to encourage AP participation. A large part 
of this campaign involved providing information. Guidance counselors and AP teachers sold the 
AP program to students who were interested in going to college, citing the scholarships one 
could earn based on AP scores, the tuition one could save by graduating at an accelerated pace, 
and the potential increase in high school GPA, which could increase the student’s likelihood of 
being in the class’s top ten percent and gaining admittance into a good college. Guidance 
counselors mentioned a shift in student and teacher attitudes toward AP courses such that AP 29 
 
courses are no longer considered only for the very brightest of students. 
The tests above suggest that increased supply of courses was not the driving force behind 
the AP participation response or the improvements in college. The fact that the effects are larger 
in the high incentive schools, suggests that providing additional supply and removing barriers to 
taking AP courses alone would not lead to success, but that increased student and teacher effort 
is an important component of the story. The fact that the effects grow over time suggest that the 
program aspect emphasized by guidance counselors such as information and outreach (that 
schools will have gotten better at over time) are also important. The body of evidence indicates 
that all aspects of the program are important and that providing cash incentives to students or 
teacher alone, or providing teacher training alone, or expanding the AP course offerings alone, 
would not have yielded the same results as the full intervention.  
 
VII Conclusions 
  Using a carefully selected of group of comparison schools within which APIP adoption is 
likely exogenous, I find that students who were affected by the APIP were more likely to 
matriculate in college (with no effect on out-of state college going), had higher GPAs, and were 
more likely to persist beyond their freshman year. These improvements were due both to 
increased college enrolment and improvements in college outcomes for those students who 
would have enrolled in college absent the program. I present a variety of tests, robustness checks, 
and falsification exercises that suggest that the estimates are not confounded by student selection, 
school selection, pre-existing trends, changes in leadership, other coincident school policies. 
While there small differences by gender, the APIP led to larger improvements in student 
performance and persistence conditional on college attendance for black and Hispanic students 
than white students. Looking to college graduation, there is little evidence of an increase overall. 
However, there is suggestive evidence of increased college graduation for Hispanic and black 
students. This implies that programs like the APIP may be effective at reducing some of the 
educational gaps that persist across ethnic groups.   
Given that I find no evidence of worse outcomes associated with the APIP, these 
improvements in college outcomes were likely the result of increased exposure to rigorous 
material induced by the APIP. Consistent with this interpretation, APIP adoption is associated 
with increased AP course taking, AP examination taking, and the effects only exist for students 30 
 
who were ex ante likely to take AP courses. The evidence on mechanisms indicate that both the 
incentive aspects and the non-incentive aspects are important. The finding that the program 
confers enduring benefits on students when  extrinsic motivators are no longer provided is 
important for the literature on student and teacher incentives in light of concerns that incentive-
based-interventions may lead to undesirable practices such as “teaching-to-the-test” and 
cheating. More generally, the lack of any documented ill-effects of the APIP, suggests that many 
of the hypothesized detrimental effects of using student incentives or teacher performance pay 
need not pose a large practical problem in a well designed incentive-based scheme that combines 
incentives with additional recourses to help translate increased effort into results.  
To get a sense of the cost-effectiveness of the APIP, consider the following conservative 
back-of-the-envelope cost/benefit calculation. The program costs about $200 per student who 
takes an AP exam per year. Roughly 7 percent of 10th graders take an AP exam after APIP 
adoption so the cost per 10th grader is about $14. Assuming a student is affected for two years, 
this comes to $28 per 10th grader. By the fourth year of implementation, the APIP increases the 
likelihood of ever being a sophomore by 6 percentage points. Under the conservative assumption 
that those students only complete one additional year of school, this would lead to an increase in 
the average overall years of schooling of 0.06 years. This implies that using the APIP program, 
one can increase the average years of educational attainment by 1 year at a cost of about $466 
per 10th grade student. For this program to not be cost effective would require the implausible 
scenario that the present discounted value of an additional year of education is less than $466. As 
such, this program is likely a worthwhile investment.
43 Given that the large increases in AP 
participation imply that low AP participation may reflect some sub-optimality, and anecdotal 
evidence from guidance counselors that the increased AP participation was the result of 
increased information, changes in peer norms, an reduced barriers to taking AP exams, it is not 
surprising that the economic returns to the program are large. The large effects of the APIP 
imply that it may be possible improve the outcomes of students by improving their decision 
making and increasing access to well taught rigorous courses.  
                                                 
43 To make this point more clear consider the following calculation; suppose the rate of return to an additional year 
of education was one percent. For someone earning the median household income of approximately $42,000 per 
year a one percent increase in wages would provide an additional $420 per year. For a worker with 35 years of work 
ahead of them, at an interest rate of 10 percent, an additional $420 per year is worth a lump sum payment of $4035 
today. This is so much larger than the per pupil cost of $300 that the rate of return to education would have to be 
much less than one percent for this program not to be cost effective. 31 
 
Overall, the findings suggest that providing monetary incentives to both students and 
teachers to promote increased participation and improved performance in rigorous courses in 
addition to providing additional resources to support the increased efforts can lead to 
meaningfully improved student outcomes. The fact that the positive effects were larger for ethnic 
minority students suggests that similar program programs may help reduce some of the 
educational differentials that currently exists across ethnic and socioeconomic groups. In light of 
research on the efficacy of early versus late interventions, these findings are noteworthy because 
they suggest that a relatively inexpensive program targeted relatively late in a student’s 
educational career can increase their eventual educational attainment to a considerable degree 
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Figure 1: New APIP schools by year. 
 









1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
List of APIP districts: Abilene ISD, Amarillo ISD, Austin ISD, Burkburnett ISD, Carrollton-
farmers Branch ISD, City view ISD, Dallas ISD, Denison ISD, Galveston ISD, Houston ISD , 
Pasadena ISD, Pflugerville ISD, Tyler ISD, Wichita Falls ISD, Ysleta ISD.  34 
 
 
Note: For all outcomes, the F-statistic associated with the null-hypothesis that the pre-treatment years differ from year t-1 yield p-values greater 
than 0.1 for all outcomes. In contrast the F-statistics associated with the null-hypothesis that the post treatment years differ from year t-1 yield p-
values smaller than 0.05 for all outcomes. 
Figure 2: Dynamic Effects of APIP Adoption. 
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Table 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEMOGRAPHICS FOR APIP SCHOOLS AND OTHER COMPARISON GROUPS 
   APIP Schools  Non-APIP Schools 
  1993-1999 2000-2005  1993-1999 2000-2005 
Enrollment 1777.68  1836.36  716.85  751.56 
  (642.34) (648.86)  (781.97) (833.36) 
%  White  30.82 25.16  59.38 53.36 
  (25.43) (23.28)  (29.46) (30.42) 
%  Black  30.17 26.24  10.32 11.30 
 (26.82)  (23.5)  (15.64)  (17.08) 
%  Hispanic  35.76 45.36  28.92 33.67 
 (23.49)  (23.84)  (28.9)  (29.5) 
%  Asian  2.93 2.39  1.09 1.12 
  (3.43) (3.65)  (2.76) (2.98) 
% Free lunch  34.33  41.60  30.42  35.51 
 (22.3)  (25.0)  (23.97)  (26.25) 
% Limited English  9.66  10.68  3.57  3.83 
 (12.89)  (11.86)  (7.71)  (6.8) 
City  0.874 0.739  0.182 0.197 
 (0.28)  (0.44)  (0.39)  (0.4) 
Rural  0.000 0.017  0.489 0.373 
  (0.0) (0.13)  (0.5) (0.48) 
Number of Schools  58    1413 





























Student Level Summary Statistics of APIP Schools Before and After APIP Adoption 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.
Not Adopted APIP Adopted APIP
Grade 10 Year 156858 1998.678 (3.247) 137704 2003.117 (3.335)
LEP  156858 0.112  (0.315)  137704 0.138  (0.345) 
Low  Income  156858 0.384  (0.486)  137704 0.459  (0.498) 
Black  156858 0.206  (0.404)  137704 0.270  (0.444) 
Hispanic  156858 0.444  (0.497)  137704 0.426  (0.494) 
Asian  156858 0.034  (0.182)  137704 0.037  (0.188) 
Native  American  156858 0.003  (0.059)  137704 0.004  (0.062) 
Female  156858 0.502  (0.5)  137704 0.510  (0.5) 
10th Grade Reading z-Score   156858  -0.092  (1.018)  137704  -0.063  (0.987) 
10th Grade Math z-score  156858  -0.091  (1.004)  137704  -0.078  (0.962) 
Take  AP  Course  156858 0.229  (0.42)  137704 0.304  (0.46) 
AP courses Taken  156858  0.652  (1.539)  137704  0.974  (1.947) 
Take  AP  exam  155753 0.055  (0.228)  138535 0.068  (0.252) 
AP Exams Taken  155753  0.097  (0.506)  138535  0.127  (0.598) 
AP Exams Passed  155753  0.047  (0.342)  138535  0.054  (0.366) 
Freshman at any school  156858  0.592  (0.691)  137704  0.570  (0.684) 
Sophomore at any school  156858  0.314  (0.561)  115783  0.310  (0.562) 
Junior at any school  154840  0.164  (0.375)  95411  0.155  (0.366) 
Freshman year GPA  58685  2.382  (1.176)  44425  2.427  (1.192) 
Graduate with a BA  147779  0.146  (0.354)  80931  0.115  (0.319) 
Graduate with a AA  156858  0.038  (0.191)  115783  0.021  (0.142) 
Graduate with a BA within 5  16871  0.019  (0.137)  71513  0.011  (0.104) 
Graduate with a AA within 4  9079  0.004  (0.063)  56773  0.002  (0.042) 
Attend college outside TX  2018  0.045  (0.208)  42293  0.037  (0.189) 
Attend college in TX  2018  0.398  (0.49)  42293  0.421  (0.494) 
Ever freshman at Private   44157  0.020  (0.142)  111838  0.041  (0.197) 
Ever freshman at Four year  156858  0.174  (0.386)  137704  0.177  (0.391) 
Ever freshman at 2yr  156858  0.418  (0.493)  137704  0.392  (0.488) 
Freshman within 0 years  156858  0.351  (0.536)  137704  0.411  (0.585) 
Freshman within 1 year  156858  0.462  (0.627)  115783  0.504  (0.653) 






Regression Estimates: Effect of years of APIP adoption on AP course taking and College Enrollment
1  2  3   4 5  6   7 8






















Adopted  0.061  0.0708 0.0246 0.042 0.019  0.023 -0.001 0.021
(ITT year>0)  [0.063]  [0.011]** [0.009]**   [0.014]** [0.010]+  [0.008]**   [0.015] [0.015]
ITT year=1  -0.008  0.066 0.031 0.029 0.013  0.016 -0.0002 0.016
[0.053]  [0.012]** [0.008]** [0.013]* [0.010]  [0.007]* [0.0146] [0.014]
ITT year=2  0.057  0.086 0.042 0.043 0.02  0.023 -0.001 0.035
[0.063]  [0.015]** [0.008]** [0.015]** [0.011]+  [0.008]** [0.015] [0.017]*
ITT year=3  0.165  0.066 0.028 0.066 0.033  0.034 - -
[0.080]*  [0.017]** [0.009]** [0.018]** [0.013]*  [0.011]** - -
ITT year=4+  0.074  0.098 0.043 0.048 0.02  0.028 - -
[0.105]  [0.021]** [0.011]** [0.020]* [0.015]  [0.014]+ - -
Controls  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES
Year FX  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES
School FX  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES
F-test   0.011  >0.000 >0.000 0.007 0.087  0.021 0.81 0.17
Observations  290,343  290,343 290,343   290,343 290,343  290,343   44,311 44,311
Robust standard errors in brackets adjusted for clustering at the school level.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
All regressions control for 10th grade test scores ethnicity, gender, LEP status and free or reduced lunch status.40 
 
Table 4 
Regression Estimates: Effect of years of APIP adoption on Freshman GPA and Enrolling in college as a sophomore
1  2 3   4 5  6 7 8
Freshman Year GPA Ever a Sophomore 
None  Imputation
Propensity 






Adopted  0.03  0.015 0.03 0.03 0.026  0.024 0.024 0.01
(ITT year>0)  [0.018]  [0.007]* [0.017]+ [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.016] [0.016] [0.017]
ITT year=1  0.009  0.004 0.009 0.008 0.007  0 -0.001 0.001
[0.020]  [0.007] [0.020] [0.009] [0.007]  [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
ITT year=2  0.043  0.022 0.044 0.027 0.023  0.008 0.008 -0.004
[0.026]+  [0.010]* [0.026]+ [0.010]** [0.009]*  [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]
ITT year=3  0.034  0.02 0.035 0.056 0.047  0.045 0.045 0.03
[0.032]  [0.014] [0.032] [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.021]* [0.021]* [0.022]
ITT year=4+  0.068  0.031 0.067 0.06 0.055  0.086 0.086 0.066
[0.029]*  [0.011]** [0.029]* [0.015]** [0.012]** [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.024]**
Cond. on Freshman  YES  NO YES NO NO  YES YES YES
School FX  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES
Year FX  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES
F-test  0.068  0.035 0.073 >0.001 >0.001  >0.001 >0.001 >0.001
Public
Observations  102,413  290,343 102,413   268,652 268,652  96,706 96,706 89,240
Robust standard errors in brackets adjusted for clustering at the school level.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 








Regression Estimates: Effect of APIP adoption duration on the timing of Freshman year entry 
1  2  3 4 5      6 7 8 9 
Freshman within  Sophomore within 
1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
ITT year=1  0.017  0.026  0.027 0.032 0.034  0.011 0.011 0.016 0.017 
[0.015] [0.017]  [0.018] [0.018]+ [0.018]+  [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.009]+ [0.009]+ 
ITT year=2  0.036  0.045 0.05  0.053 0.054  0.02  0.021 0.023 0.024 
[0.016]* [0.017]* [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.010]+  [0.011]+  [0.011]*  [0.011]* 
ITT year=3  0.038  0.048  0.055  0.06  0.063  0.036 0.042 0.049 0.052 
[0.019]+ [0.021]*  [0.021]*  [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.010]**  [0.012]**  [0.012]**  [0.012]** 
ITT year=4+  0.017 0.025  0.028  0.033  0.039  0.051 0.053 0.057 0.058 
[0.024] [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.024] [0.023]+ [0.013]**  [0.016]**  [0.016]**  [0.015]** 
Observations  224971  224971  224971 224971 224971  224971 224971 224971 224971 
R-squared  0.19  0.2 0.21 0.21 0.21  0.13 0.17 0.17 0.17 
F: no effect  0  0.01  0  0  0     0  0.01  0  0 
Robust standard errors in brackets adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 












Regression Estimates: Effect of APIP program on selected student characteristics by adoption cohort



























Adopted  -0.039  -0.013  0.009 -0.039 0.005 -0.025 0.01 -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.013 0.002 
ITT year>0  [0.025]  [0.021]  [0.011] [0.018]* [0.011] [0.012]* [0.032]  [0.040] [0.006] [0.010] [0.012] [0.007] 
ITT year=1  -0.02  0.013  0.009 -0.021 0.003 -0.014 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.011 -0.019 0
[0.026]  [0.021]  [0.007] [0.015] [0.008] [0.010] [0.026]  [0.024] [0.005] [0.011] [0.013] [0.006] 
ITT year=2  -0.051  -0.035  0.005 -0.044 0.005 -0.024 0.015 0.004 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013 0.005 
[0.032]+  [0.024]  [0.012] [0.021]* [0.011] [0.013]+ [0.038]  [0.045] [0.006] [0.012] [0.013] [0.008] 
ITT year=3  -0.049  -0.016  0.011 -0.049 0.001 -0.040 0.014 -0.024 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 0.005 
[0.034]  [0.030]  [0.016] [0.024]* [0.015] [0.017]* [0.041]  [0.039] [0.006] [0.013] [0.013] [0.008] 
ITT year=4+  -0.050  -0.047  0.017 -0.068 0.012 -0.045 0.018 0.017 -0.007 0.009 0.002 -0.002 
[0.033]  [0.29]  [0.022] [0.030]* [0.016] [0.020]* [0.048]  [0.052] [0.007] [0.014] [0.017] [0.010] 
0.07 
School FX  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FX  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations  290343  290343  290343 290343 290343 290343 290343  290343 290343 290343 104367 290343 
F: no effect  0.29  0.07  0.45 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.98 0.88 0.89 0.46 0.44 0.63
Robust standard errors in brackets adjusted for clustering at the school level.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%43 
 
Table 7 
Summary Means and Standard Deviations for outcomes by Ethnicity 
Black Hispanic White
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.
Take any AP course  0.225 (0.418) 0.211 (0.408)  0.354 (0.478)
AP courses Taken  0.638 (1.521) 0.560 (1.415)  1.186 (2.107)
Take any AP exams  0.034 (0.182) 0.039 (0.193)  0.106 (0.308)
AP Exams Taken  0.052 (0.333) 0.064 (0.393)  0.203 (0.756)
AP Exams Passed  0.009 (0.133) 0.021 (0.192)  0.113 (0.542)
Read score 10th grade  -0.257 (1.044) -0.203 (0.995)  0.247 (0.903)
Math score 10th grade  -0.343 (0.966) -0.203 (0.951)  0.261 (0.939)
LEP  0.008 (0.091) 0.258 (0.438)  0.006 (0.08)
Low income  0.476 (0.499) 0.574 (0.494)  0.146 (0.353)
Female  0.521 (0.5) 0.505 (0.5)  0.499 (0.5)
Ever a freshman  0.566 (0.689) 0.445 (0.618)  0.773 (0.722)
Ever a sophomore  0.256 (0.523) 0.230 (0.494)  0.445 (0.625)
Ever a junior  0.119 (0.327) 0.095 (0.296)  0.266 (0.448)
Freshman GPA  2.071 (1.204) 2.319 (1.187)  2.599 (1.131)
Graduate with BA  0.090 (0.286) 0.080 (0.271)  0.232 (0.422)
Graduate with AA  0.019 (0.137) 0.029 (0.167)  0.041 (0.198)
College outside TX  0.050 (0.217) 0.018 (0.134)  0.071 (0.256)
College in TX  0.383 (0.486) 0.383 (0.486)  0.526 (0.499)
Freshman at Private college  0.047 (0.212) 0.013 (0.114)  0.067 (0.251)
Freshman at 4yr College  0.187 (0.4) 0.099 (0.302)  0.269 (0.454)





















Regression Estimates: APIP Effects by cohort on College outcomes [interacted with demographic indicators] 




















ITT year=1  -0.0378  0.047  0.03  0.026  0.0171  0.00645  0.029  0.0233+ 0.0333** 0.0380* 
[0.0910] [0.033]  [0.025] [0.0201] [0.0140] [0.0163]  [0.0315] [0.0123] [0.0104] [0.0186] 
* Black  0.039  0.001  -0.013  0.00849  0.0111  0.00954  0.00606  -0.00465  -0.0125  -0.00866 
[0.0893] [0.039]  [0.027] [0.0264] [0.0149] [0.0238]  [0.0473] [0.0137]  [0.0110]  [0.0223] 
* Hispanic  -0.00514  0.025  0.005  -0.0274  -0.0166  -0.0241  -0.0614  -0.0361*  -0.0471**  -0.0742** 
[0.0800] [0.031]  [0.025] [0.0194] [0.0124] [0.0202]  [0.0498] [0.0142]  [0.0116]  [0.0193] 
* Female  -0.00795  0.005  0.001  0.0230*  0.00923  0.0115  0.00789  0.00699  -0.00143  -0.00584 
[0.0229] [0.010]  [0.008] [0.00951]  [0.00582]  [0.0118]  [0.0304]  [0.00919] [0.00812]  [0.0149] 
ITT year=2  -0.0534  0.087 0.062  0.0450*  0.024 0.00E+00  0.0467  0.0260+ 0.0252* -0.0138 
[0.0910]  [0.020]** [0.014]**  [0.0218]  [0.0167] [0.0194]  [0.0407] [0.0131] [0.0118] [0.0214] 
* Black  0.0238  -0.002  -0.029  0.00906  0.0179  0.0232  -0.00487  -0.00126  -0.000174  0.0234 
[0.0804] [0.019] [0.013]* [0.0269] [0.0196] [0.0264]  [0.0661] [0.0152]  [0.0129]  [0.0243] 
* Hispanic  0.0835  0.021  -0.012  -0.0294  -0.0133  0.0281  -0.00271  -0.00782  -0.0152  0.0205 
[0.0787] [0.021]  [0.015] [0.0199] [0.0148] [0.0204]  [0.0771] [0.0147]  [0.0141]  [0.0314] 
*  Female  0.0828**  -0.026 -0.017 0.0124  0.000786  0.015 0.0154 0.0156  0.0137  0.0422+ 
[0.0290] [0.011]* [0.007]* [0.00899]  [0.00540] [0.0135] [0.0326] [0.00988]  [0.00936]  [0.0223] 
ITT year=3  0.128  0.086 0.046  0.0781**  0.0376+  0.0144 0.0257 0.0692** 0.0657**  0.0458+ 
[0.0916]  [0.029]** [0.016]**  [0.0262]  [0.0205]  [0.0216] [0.0427]  [0.0209] [0.0173] [0.0258] 
*  Black  -0.0712 -0.039  -0.032 0.00936 0.0206 0.0499+  0.0749 -0.00968 -0.00834 0.000164 
[0.0719] [0.031] [0.018]+ [0.0271] [0.0214] [0.0265]  [0.0569] [0.0221]  [0.0188]  [0.0300] 
* Hispanic  0.0487  -0.028  -0.016  -0.0652**  -0.0193 0.00855 0.0446  -0.0291  -0.0370*  -0.00607 
[0.0744] [0.031]  [0.018] [0.0211]  [0.0169] [0.0228]  [0.0649] [0.0185]  [0.0169]  [0.0343] 
* Female  0.0349  0.011  0.007  0.0138  -0.00282  -0.0195  -0.023  0.00121  -0.00345  0.0173 
[0.0301] [0.010]  [0.008] [0.0101]  [0.00688]  [0.0167]  [0.0369]  [0.00896] [0.00863]  [0.0170] 
ITT year=4+  0.138  0.104 0.045  0.0534+  0.0265 -0.0102  0.0358 0.0531* 0.0482** 0.0485* 
[0.128]  [0.025]** [0.014]**  [0.0297]  [0.0256] [0.0156]  [0.0366] [0.0210] [0.0159] [0.0231] 
* Black  -0.0833  -0.012  -0.002  0.00976  0.0333  0.138** 0.161**  0.0272  0.0417** 0.0857** 
[0.0723] [0.019]  [0.012] [0.0300] [0.0257] [0.0156] [0.0452]  [0.0181]  [0.0129] [0.0207] 
* Hispanic  -0.0492  -0.004  0.007  -0.0543*  -0.0115  0.0118  0.0311  -0.00187  -0.00678  0.0494* 
[0.0611] [0.019]  [0.012] [0.0270] [0.0219] [0.0147]  [0.0474] [0.0186]  [0.0142]  [0.0218] 
* Female  -0.0531*  0.006 0.002  0.0289**  0.000277 0.00831 0.00258  0.00749  0.000187  0.00154 
[0.0262]  [0.008] [0.004]  [0.00695]  [0.00417] [0.00965] [0.0219]  [0.00862]  [0.00779]  [0.0124] 
Pr(all ethnic same)  0.14  0.75  0.06  >0.000  0.12  >0.000  0.018  0.002  >0.000  >0.000 
Pr(all sex same)  0.002  0.139  0.154  0.0013  0.579  0.151  0.853  0.519  0.341  0.267 
Year  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES YES YES 
School-by-race FX  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES YES YES 
Control for selection  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A impute  prop uncond. impute  prop 
Observations  290,343 290,343 290,343 290,343 290,343 290,343  102,413 268,652  268,652  96,706 
Robust standard errors in brackets adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 







Regression Estimates: Effect of Years of APIP adoption on longer-run College outcomes by Ethnicity 






















All (224971 observations) 
ITT year= 1  0.005  0.002  0.008  4.395  1.589  0.016 0.012  0.027  0.033 
[0.006] [0.003] [0.006]  [1.843]*  [2.022]  [0.006]** [0.006]+  [0.010]*  [0.017]+ 
ITT year= 2  0.003  0  0.008  6.626  2.606  0.019 0.013  0.033  0.053 
[0.009] [0.004] [0.009]  [1.708]**  [2.000]  [0.007]** [0.007]+  [0.010]**  [0.017]** 
ITT year= 3  0.005  0  0.009  9.368 5.061 0.022 0.015  0.061  0.065 
[0.012] [0.004] [0.012]  [2.205]** [2.209]*  [0.009]* [0.009]+ [0.013]** [0.019]** 
ITT year= 4+  -0.018  -0.01  -0.016  4.185  3.708 0.013 0.008  0.065 0.04 
   [0.016]  [0.006]+  [0.016]  [2.413]+  [2.457] [0.011] [0.010]  [0.016]** [0.023]+ 
Black (54059 observations) 
ITT year= 1  0.016  0.002  0.018  3.131 0.055 0.016 0.013  0.011 0.001 
[0.010] [0.005]  [0.009]*  [2.819] [2.190]  [0.009]+ [0.008]+  [0.014] [0.026] 
ITT year= 2  0.01  -0.003  0.011  3.461 -0.775 0.011 0.004  0.011  0.013 
[0.011] [0.005] [0.011] [2.247]  [1.595] [0.008] [0.006]  [0.013]  [0.022] 
ITT year= 3  0.017  -0.005  0.018 7.68  3.525 0.017 0.012  0.034 0.038 
[0.012] [0.005]  [0.011]+ [2.600]**  [1.765]+  [0.010]+  [0.008]  [0.014]* [0.021]+ 
ITT year= 4+  0.003  -0.01  0.010  5.997  2.94  0.012  0.01  0.047  -0.012 
   [0.012]  [0.007]  [0.011]  [3.674] [1.761] [0.012] [0.010] [0.020]*  [0.025] 
Hispanic (93171) 
ITT year= 1  0.011  0  0.012  1.68 -1.998  0.013  0.004 0.021 0.015 
[0.006]+  [0.005]  [0.005]*  [2.025] [2.430]  [0.006]*  [0.006] [0.013] [0.016] 
ITT year= 2  0.018  -0.003  0.022 4.561 -1.187  0.022  0.011  0.035  0.03 
[0.010]+  [0.006]  [0.008]* [2.372]+  [3.039]  [0.008]**  [0.007]  [0.014]*  [0.018] 
ITT year= 3  0.024  -0.005  0.026 6.828 -0.549  0.021  0.007  0.052  0.027 
[0.010]*  [0.005]  [0.010]* [1.949]**  [2.349]  [0.007]**  [0.006]  [0.014]**  [0.021] 
ITT year= 4+  0.023  -0.003  0.025  4.793 -1.579 0.021  0.008  0.062  0.016 
   [0.012]+  [0.007]  [0.011]*  [2.878] [3.518]  [0.009]*  [0.009]  [0.019]**  [0.028] 
White (68722) 
ITT year= 1  0.004  0.004  0.01  4.909  2.552  0.024 0.023  0.038  0.041 
[0.009] [0.007] [0.009] [3.004]  [2.659] [0.011]* [0.011]*  [0.015]*  [0.024]+ 
ITT year= 2  0.004  0.003  0.013  6.505  3.417  0.024 0.023  0.042  0.064 
[0.011] [0.006] [0.012]  [2.679]*  [2.627]  [0.012]+ [0.013]+  [0.017]*  [0.025]* 
ITT year= 3  -0.005  0.005  0.005  9.038 5.275 0.027 0.027  0.075 0.078 
[0.012] [0.007] [0.013]  [2.763]** [3.129]+  [0.016]+  [0.017]  [0.021]** [0.029]** 
ITT year= 4+  -0.017  -0.007  -0.011  7.107 5.421 0.024 0.026  0.089 0.074 
   [0.018]  [0.010]  [0.018]  [2.815]* [2.804]+  [0.017] [0.017] [0.023]** [0.034]* 
Robust standard errors in brackets adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 









Appendix Table 1: Robustness Checks 
Regression Estimates: Effect of APIP adoption years on college outcomes for different sub-samples (robustness check) 
























No controls  
ITT year= 1  -0.017  0.065  0.031  0.029 0.002  0.003 0.007  0.006  -0.003 
[0.051] [0.012]**  [0.008]**  [0.017]+ [0.012] [0.022]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.016] 
ITT  year=  2  0.034 0.883 0.041 0.034 0.014  0.039 0.024  0.019  0.004 
[0.063] [0.015]**  [0.008]**  [0.020]+ [0.014] [0.028] [0.012]*  [0.012]  [0.019] 
ITT  year=  3  0.123 0.064 0.028 0.061 0.013  0.023 0.052  0.044  0.043 
[0.076] [0.017]**  [0.009]**  [0.023]* [0.016] [0.032]  [0.014]** [0.014]**  [0.021]* 
ITT  year=  4+  0.059 0.095 0.043 0.046 0.034  0.071 0.059  0.055  0.087 
   [0.108]  [0.020]*  [0.011]**  [0.025]+  [0.016]* [0.031]* [0.016]**  [0.014]**  [0.022]** 
Middle school and high school fixed effect and only feeder schools   
ITT  year=  1  0.096 0.075 0.039 0.013 0.004 0.011 -0.009  -0.005  -0.015 
[0.052]+ [0.018]**  [0.012]**  [0.015]  [0.009] [0.021]  [0.014]  [0.011]  [0.020] 
ITT  year=  2  0.166 0.085 0.046 0.037 0.03  0.045 0.01  0.009  -0.007 
[0.065]* [0.021]**  [0.011]** [0.017]* [0.013]* [0.035]  [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.024] 
ITT year= 3  0.3  0.086  0.041  0.054 0.026  0.031 0.047  0.039  0.035 
[0.080]** [0.023]** [0.012]** [0.017]**  [0.016] [0.038]  [0.014]** [0.012]**  [0.023] 
ITT year= 4+  0.172  0.122  0.06  0.052 0.027  0.049 0.047  0.04  0.047 
   [0.083]*  [0.031]**  [0.017]**  [0.022]*  [0.012]* [0.028]+  [0.018]*  [0.014]**  [0.027]+ 
School intercepts and trends included  
ITT  year=  1  0.003 0.065 0.034 0.008 0.004 -0.008 -0.001  0.001  -0.007 
[0.050] [0.016]**  [0.010]** [0.011]  [0.009] [0.024]  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.015] 
ITT  year=  2  0.074 0.084 0.045 0.025 0.024 0.01  0.004  0.003  -0.021 
[0.062] [0.016]**  [0.009]**  [0.015]+ [0.014] [0.048]  [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.017] 
ITT year= 3  0.201  0.08  0.04  0.03 0.049  0.029 0.03  0.026  0.018 
[0.082]* [0.022]**  [0.011]** [0.017]+ [0.017]** [0.055]  [0.014]*  [0.010]*  [0.024] 
ITT  year=  4+  0.113 0.129 0.065 0.017 0.078  0.075 0.028  0.026  0.035 
   [0.105]  [0.031]**  [0.017]**  [0.021]  [0.016]** [0.060]  [0.016]+  [0.014]+  [0.034] 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted for clustering at the school level. +significant at 10% level ; * 
significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. All models include cohort fixed effects and high-school fixed effects. All models 
except the top panel include the full set of controls as in Table 3. 
 
Appendix Table 2: Principal Turnover and APIP adoption 













Adopted 0.004  0.058 0.003 0.026 0.004  -0.092
ITT  year>0  [0.059] [0.066] [0.046] [0.055]  [0.068]  [0.070] 
Observations  411 466 473 583  530  580 
R-squared  0.12 0.1 0.13 0.1  0.11  0.12 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level.  




Appendix Table 3:  Effect on AP exam subjects taken 
 
Effects on log AP exam taking  at school in a given year: by subject 
1 2 3 4  5
Math and Computer 
Science English 




ITT year= 1  0.084 0.285 0.013 0.134  -0.16
[0.138] [0.133*  [0.155] [0.129]  [0.22] 
ITT year= 2  0.082 0.403  0.081  0.028  -0.037 
[0.211] [0.200]*  [0.261] [0.176]  [0.365] 
ITT year= 3  0.294 0.677  0.244  0.441  0.38 
[0.204] [0.204]**  [0.305] [0.213]*  [0.423] 
ITT year= 4+  0.214 0.804  0.284  0.803  0.289 
[0.25] [0.238]**  [0.326]  [0.218]**  [0.328] 
Observations  570  570 570 570  570 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level.  
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. All regressions include school and year fixed effects. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4:  Changes in AP course and exam Takers after Adoption 
1 2  3  4  5      6  7 8  9 10 







































ITT years= 1  -4.436  -1.304  0.013  0.02  0.017 -3.029  0.459  -0.015  0.005  -0.008 
[7.667] [7.233]  [0.022]  [0.014]  [0.010]  [7.558] [7.099]  [0.022]  [0.014]  [0.007] 
ITT years= 2  -14.888  -6.259  0.012  0.002  0.011 -12.418  -7.98  -0.022  -0.003  -0.007 
[9.446] [8.397]  [0.043]  [0.022]  [0.015]  [10.529] [9.328]  [0.043]  [0.024]  [0.012] 
ITT years= 3  -10.477  -5.166  -0.056  -0.015  0.001 -4.842  -0.799  -0.07  -0.033  -0.012 
[8.673] [8.10]  [0.05]  [0.022]  [0.017]  [10.27] [8.994]  [0.051]  [0.026]  [0.014] 
ITT years= 4+  -7.994  -5.513  0.053  0.031  0.029 -1.859  -1.139  -0.002  -0.011  0.008 
[8.64] [8.773]  [0.058]  [0.028]  [0.019]  [12.805] [11.867]  [0.058]  [0.031]  [0.016] 
School FX  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
Year FX  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 18008  18008  18008  18008  18008      61855 61855  61855  61855  61855 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted for clustering at the school level. 












Appendix Table 5 




























ITT years= 1  0.01  0.014  -0.021 -0.029 -0.054 -0.418 -0.839  0.307 -0.147
[0.01]  [0.013]  [0.077] [0.025] [0.027]+ [0.455]  [2.206]  [0.410] [1.004]
ITT years= 2  0.016  0.013  0.161 -0.061 -0.089 1.118 -7.308  0.486 2.127
[0.011]  [0.014]  [0.107] [0.041] [0.053] [0.633]  [3.090]*  [0.545] [0.897]*
ITT years= 3  0.015  0.012  -0.071 -0.088 -0.046 1.747 -3.406  0.117 0.439
[0.01]  [0.016]  [0.073] [0.035]* [0.042] [1.231]  [2.526]  [0.598] [1.384]
ITT years= 4+  0.014  0.018  -0.07 0.074 0.03 2.634 5.624  -0.101 -1.002
[0.012]  [0.017]  [0.067] [0.037] [0.052] [1.017]*  [2.953]  [0.537] [1.935]
School Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES
Year Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES
Level of Observation  student school school school school school  school school school
Observations 294288  583  531 531 531 583 583  583 583
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering at the school level.  
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Appendix Note 1: Relationships with donors 
 
  Given that APIP adoption was not random, readers may worry that schools could self-select into 
the APIP. Because the analytical sample includes only those schools that may have selected into the 
program and all analysis are based on within-school variation, this kind of self-selection will not bias the 
result as long as there are not changes in schools that coincide with the exact timing of APIP adoption 
[which is about two years after when selection would take place). In any case, it is important to ascertain 
the extent to which schools may have selected into the APIP. One natural question to ask is whether the 
APIP donors had previous contact with the schools. If so, it would imply that the APIP schools are those 
kinds of schools with relationships to donor organizations. However, is does not imply that the timing of 
adoption is endogenous to changes within schools. Of the schools that were treated in sample, 7 of them 
had donors for which there were previous projects.
44 However, none of these schools had any coincident 
projects that would confound the APIP effects. To ensure that the results are not driven by these schools, I 
ran the main models excluding these schools and the results are unchanged. Of the comparison APIP 
schools [i.e. those APIP school that have not yet adopted), 7 of the Austin schools had relationships with 
the Michael and Susan Dell Foundation. These 7 Austin schools adopt the APIP in 2008, so they serve as 
comparison schools in my data. However, starting in 2002 there was the Advancement Via Individual 
Determination [AVID) program, Project Advance, and Project Smart in these schools. All of these 
programs are College readiness programs that would lead to an underestimate of the APIP effect [because 
these schools serve as comparison schools rather than treatment schools in these data). Again, I have 
determined that the results are robust to excluding these seven schools.  
  Another important related question is whether any of the donors were involved in other 
concurrent projects in schools that would confound the APIP effect. While the answer for most school is 
no, there is one potentially problematic donor relationship that requires some discussion. In 5 of the 
                                                 
44 Dodge Jones Foundation in Abilene (2 in 2003); Perkins Prothro Foundation in Wichita Falls (3 in 2002); Munson 
Foundation in Denison (1 in 2004); Fourth Partner Foundation in Tyler (2 in 2002). 49 
 
Dallas schools that started the program in 2003
45, the donor offered scholarships to any student who was 
accepted to college. As such, for these schools the APIP effect is potentially confounded with a financial 
aid effect. To ensure that these 5 schools do not drive the main results, I have replicated the analysis 
without these five schools and the treatment effects are slightly larger with these school excluded. As 
such, I can rule out that the few potentially problematic donor relationships bias the results. 
 
 
Appendix Note 2: Related Statewide Policies During the Sample Period. 
 
The Texas ten percent rule was put in place in 1997 and ensured that the top ten percent of students 
from each high school in the state would be guaranteed admission to a Texas public university. One 
would expect college matriculation rates to have increased in schools that have on average low 
achievement, such as the selected APIP schools, even if these schools did not adopt the APIP. However, 
none of the APIP schools adopted the APIP in 1997 so that the timing of adoption is not coincident with 
the introduction of the new state policy. Furthermore, all the main results are robust to using only those 
schools that adopted the APIP after 2000. 
The Texas statewide Advanced Placement Incentive Program was introduced in academic year 
1999-2000. Under the statewide program, the state appropriated $21 million over the years 1998-2000 for 
the Texas APIP, up from $3 million the previous biennium. The statewide program provides a $30 
reduction in exam fees for all public school students who are approved to take the AP exams, teacher 
training grants of up to $450, up to $3,000 in equipment and material grants for AP classes, and financial 
incentives to the schools of up to $100 for each student who scores 3 or better on any AP exam. One 
would expect this policy to increase AP participation and effort even if the APIP was not adopted by the 
selected APIP schools. However all the estimated effects are above and beyond any effect from the 
statewide program. [Source: Texas Education Agency Press Release: “Number of Advanced Placement 
Exams Taken by Texas Students Increases Dramatically”. August 23, 2000).  
 
 
Figure A1: Effect of the APIP on persisting to Junior Year and Graduating by Ethnicity 
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Effect of APIP adoption year on college graduation